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CHAPTER 7 
Evidence 
KENNETH J. MALLOY" 
§7.1. Heamy Exreptiom' Declaration• Again" PLal Intere,.. A• 
a result of the Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Commonwealth v. 
Carr, 1 Massachusetts has joined the growing number of jurisdictions 2 
which recognize as an exception to the hearsay rule~declarations to a 
third party against the declarant's penal interest. Unt'l Carr, the Court 
had allowed the statements against the declarant's ecuniary or pro-
prietary interest,3 but refused to admit statements against the declarant's 
penal interest.4 While not expressly based on this, the Court's position 
regarding the inadmissibility of declarations against ~enal interest was 
in line with the House of Lords decision in the Suss x Peerage Case,5 
"which was read by contemporary writers as limitin the hearsay ex-
ception to statements tending to impair the declarant's pecuniary or 
proprietary interest." 6 McCormick states that the Sussex Peerage Case 
was responsible for creating the distinction in this {country between 
declarations against pecuniary or proprietary in teres (which are ad-
missible) and declarations against penal interest ( whi h are not admis-
sible) .7 
In Carr, the defendant was convicted of selling a controlled substance, 
by vi1tue of participating in a sale to an undercov r police officer.8 
° KENNETH J. MALLOY is an Instructor of Law at W stern New England 
College School of Law. Mr. Malloy wishes to thank Patrick Nally, a second year 
student, for his assistance. 
§7.1. 1 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2312, 369 N.E.2d 970. ~ 
2 See Note, Declarations Against Penal Interest: Standa ds of Admissibility 
Under an Emerging Ma;ority Rule, 56 B.U.L. REv. 148, 148- 9 n.5 (1976). See 
also C. McCoRMICK, Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 2 8 (2d ed. 1972 & 
Supp. 1978) [hereinafter cited as McCoRMICK]. 
3 See Currier v. Gale, 80 Mass. ( 14 Gray) 504 ( 1860); Pool v. Bridges, 
21 Mass. ( 4 Pick.) 377 ( 1826). 
4 Se€1 Commonwealth v. Densmore, 94 Mass. ( 12 Allen) 1535 ( 1866); Com-
monwealth v. Chabbock, 1 Mass. 143 ( 1804). See also cases cited in Carr, 1977 
Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2316 n.2, 369 N.E.2d at 972 n.2. 
5 8 Eng. Rep. 1034 ( 1844 ). 
G 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2316, 369 N.E.2d at 972. 
7 McCORMICK, supra note 2, § 278 at 673 (2d·ed. 1972). 
8 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2312-13, 369 N.E.2d at 970-71. 
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The evidence at the trial showed that two rnen who identified them-
selves as "Frank" and "Otto" met with the officer on a sidewalk and 
sold him cocaine.9 Frank told the officer that Otto would provide him 
with the drugs. Thereupon the officer paid one of them $450 for the 
cocaine, which was handed over by Otto.10 The police later arrested 
Nelson Wood as the "Frank" and the defendant Carr as the "Otto" in the 
sale.11 
At Carr's trial, Carr sought to have himself, his mother, and a friend 
testify that Wood on numerous occasions had made statements to them 
implicating Wood alone in the crime and exonerating Carr as not being 
the Otto involved in the saleP This offer was made after Wood, on 
voir dire, invoked his privilege against self-incrimination and refused 
to testify about his relation with the defendant or his out-of-court 
statements.13 The judge excluded the testimony of the three witnesses 
as inadmissible hearsay, and Carr was convicted.14 Carr made a post-
verdict motion for a new trial, and the trial judge reported the question 
of the admissibility of the hearsay. The judge stated that if his exclusion 
were found to be error, he would grant the motion for a new triaJ.l 5 
After reviewing the facts of the case and the offers of proof, the 
Supreme Judicial Court turned to the checkered history of the rule 
against admitting declarations against penal interest as an exception 
to the hearsay rule. The Court noted the development of the rule in 
Massachusetts,16 the inHuence in America of the Sussex Peerage CaseP 
and criticism leveled at the rule by Mr. Justice Holmes 18 and leading 
Anglo-American text writers.19 It went on to review abolition of the 
9 Id. at 2313, 369 N.E.2d at 971. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 2314, 369 N.E.2d at 971. 
12 Id. at 2312, 369 N.E.2d at 971. 
13 Id. at 2314, 369 N.E.2d at 971. 
14 Id. at 2312, 369 N.E.2d at 971. 
15 Id. at 2313, 369 N.E.2d at 971. 
16 Id. at 2315-16, 369 N.E.2d at 972. 
17 8 Eng. Rep. 1034 (1844). See text at notes 5-7 supra. 
lR 1977 J\Iass. Adv. St. at 2316, 369 N.E.2d at 972 quoting Donnelly v. United 
States, 228 U.S. 243, 277 (1913) (Holmes, J. dissenting). Justice Hohnes stated 
in part: 
The rules of evidence in the main are based on experience, logic, and common 
sense, less hampered by history than some parts of the substantive law. There 
is no decision by this court against the admissibility of such a confession; the 
English cases since the separation of the two countries do not bind us; the 
exception to the hearsay rule in the case of declarations against interest is well 
known; no statement is so much against interest as a confession to murder. ... 
1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2317, 369 N.E.2d at 972. 
1il 1977 ;\lass. Adv. Sh. at 2317, 369 N.E.2d at 972-73 citing McCoRMICK, supra 
note 2, at § 278 ( 2d ed. 1972); R. Cnoss, EviDENCE 465 (4th ed. 1974); 5 J. Wxc-
~IORE, EviDENCE § 1477 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974). 
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rule by model code draftsmen 20 and judicial abrogati n of the rule in 
New York 21 and California.22 The Court then turned to abrogation of 
the rule in the Federal Rules of Evidence, regardin this as "[m]ost 
suggestive and significant ... ," 23 
Rule 804 (b) ( 3) of the Federal Rules of Evidence · corporates both 
declarations against financial interest and declaratio s against penal 
interest as exceptions to the hearsay rule. 24 To be adm ssible, a declara-
tion against penal interest must meet a higher threshol than a declara-
tion against proprietary or pecuniary interest: not onl must the state-
ment at the time of its making be so contrary to the declarant's penal 
interest that a reasonable man would not have made it if it were not 
true, but it must also be attended with "corroborati g circumstances 
clearly indicat[ing] the trustworthiness of the statem nt." 25 
The Court, "impressed favorably" by the federal evidentiary rule, 
stated that it would be "followed in substance" in the Commonwealth, 
but the Court would not commit itself to total adoption of Rule 804(b)(3) 
because of still outstanding study of the problem by a committee ap-
pointed by the Court.26 It then turned to the twin r quirements that 
the statement be corroborated and be against the de arant's penal in-
terest. Because of the undeveloped nature of the evi ence, the Court 
felt unable to resolve the issues as they affected Wo d's statements.27 
As for the corroboration requirement, it was left f r the trial court 
on remand to "consider as relevant factors the degree of disinterestedness 
of the witnesses giving corroborative testimony [Carr, his mother, and 
20 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2317, 369 N.E.2d at 973 citing 
DENCE rule 509 ( 1942); UNIFORM RuLES OF EviDENCE rule 63( 
21 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2317, 369 N.E.ild at 973 citing 
N.Y.2d 88, 308 N.Y.S.2d 825, 257 N.E.2d 16 (1970). 
ODEL CoDE OF Evx-
0) (1974 rev. ed.). 
eople v. Brown, 26 
22 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2317, 369 N.E.2d at 973 citing P ople v. Spriggs, 60 
Cal.2d 868, 36 Cal. Rptr. 841, 389 P.2d 377 (1964). 
23 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2318, 369 N.E.2d at 973. 
24 FED. R. Evm. 804(b) ( 3) provides: 
(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule 
if the declarant is unavailable as a witness: ... 
( 3) Statement against interest. A statement which was a the time of its 
making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or prop 'etary interest, or 
so far tended to subject him to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid 
a claim by him against another, that a reasonable man in I is position would 
not have made the statement unless he believed it to be t e. A statement 
tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and off red to exculpate 
the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstanc s clearly indicate 
the trustworthiness of the statement. 
I d. 
211 Id. 
26 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2319, 369 N.E.2d at 974. 
27 Id. at 2320, 369 N.E.2d at 974. 
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his friend] as well as the plausibility of that testimony in the light of 
the rest of the proof." 28 
The Court's discussion of the "against declarant's penal interest" re-
quirement is especially interesting in light of the facts of Carr. After he 
was arrested, Wood was declared drug-dependent under General Laws 
chapter 123, section 47.29 The case against Wood was accordingly 
stayed for a year, with the indictlllent to be dismissed upon successful 
completion of a prescribed treatment.30 The Court pointed out that 
this might raise an issue as to "whether Wood reasonably would fear 
that penal consequences might flow from his disclosures." 31 For if the 
trial judge were to make the determination that Wood's involvement 
in the drug treatment program ·had the effect of making the state-
ments-at the time of their making-not truly against Wood's penal 
interest, then the testimony of Carr, his mother, and his friend would 
not be admissible. The Court hastened to point out: "The fact that 
Wood's claim of privilege was allowed does not necessarily betoken an 
affirmative answer to this question." 32 In a footnote the Court, follow-
ing its decision in Commonwealth v. Di Pietro,33 stated that Wood's 
successful invocation of this privilege made him "unavailable" for the 
purposes of the unavailability of the declaration against interest ex-
ception.34 
While Carr allowed the Court to reexamine its prior position on the 
declaration against penal interest rule, the case did not afford the Court 
the opportunity to develop more fully the scope of the rule newly adopted 
in Massachusetts. One has to wonder if the statements were in the first 
place against Wood's penal interest. If Wood had said, "I did it, and 
Carr did not," his statement concerning Carr would probably be re-
garded as against Woods penal interest, because he would be substitut-
ing himself for Carr as the guilty party. But if Wood had said, "I did it, 
but Carr was not involved with me," it is hard to see how the part of 
his statement exonerating Carr can be against Wood's penal interest. 
Whether or not Carr was involved with him will not affect his penal 
interest, and accordingly such a statement does not seem to be as 
inherently trustworthy as a "substituting" statement. 
A more nagging problem concerns Wood's status as a drug-dependent 
person who at the end of successful treatment would be entitled to a 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. See G.L. c. 123, § 47, para. 22. 
31 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2321, 369 N.E.2d at 974. 
32 Id., 369 N.E.2d at 974-75. 
33 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1971, 367 N.E.2d 811. Dt Pietro is discussed at § 7.2 
infra. 
34 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2320 n.20, 369 N.E.2d at 974 n.20. See note 24 supra. 
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dismissal. The test adopted by Rule 804 (b) ( 3) is formulated as an 
objective one: whether a reasonable man, albeit in the declarant's 
position, would, at the time of the utterance, have feared criminal 
punishment might follow from his statement.35 McCormick points out 
that difficulty inheres in exploring the actual state ff mind of the 
declarant, and concludes that an objective test will pro uce "satisfactory 
results in the vast majority of cases." 36 This may be on of the minority 
of cases where an objective test will not be probative o fear of punish-
ment: ·wood's dismissal was not certain; it hinged on whether he 
successfully completed his drug tl'eatment program. Here, the sub-
jective factors of Wood's 'likelihood of completing the year-long pro-
gram, and how much time remained to it, rise to the fore. 
It will remain for future cases to develop the scope of the rule in 
Massachusetts now adopted by Carr, just what is again1 the declarant's 
penal interest and how well corroborated is a statem nt. In this the 
Court will likely be guided by the experience of othe · jurisdictions in 
resolving these issues. For the moment, at least, the ourt has made 
an important breakthrough in taking away one of t e most illogical 
inconsistencies that are part and parcel of the hearsay rule. 
§7.2. Admission of Prior Testimony of Unavailable Witness: Asser-
tion of Testimonial Privilege as Constituting Unavailability. In Com-
monwealth v. Di Pietro,! the Supreme Judicial Court expanded the 
meaning of an "unavailable witness" to include witnes es who success-
fully assert a testimonial privilege and refuse to testi at trial. The 
Di Pietro Court held that the testimony of a witnes at a probable 
cause hearing may be introduced into evidence as an xception to the 
hearsay rule in a subsequent trial or retrial at whi h that witness 
claims a testimonial privilege, provided the previous estimony meets 
other conditions for admissibility.2 
Prior to this decision, Massachusetts case law extended only to allow 
introduction of the previous testimony of witnesses in situations where 
the witness had died,H had become insane since giving the original 
testimony,4 or could not be found or compelled to ret rn to the com-
~~-.onwealth for the re-trial of the same case.5 The C urt stated that 
35 See note 24 supra. 
3G McCoRMICK, supra note 2, § 278 at 83 ( 1978 Supp.). 
§7.2. 1 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1971, 367 N.E.2d 81l. 
2 Id. at 1984, 367 N.E.2d at 818. 
3 See Commonwealth v. Mustone, 353 Mass. 490, 491, 233 N.E.2d 1, :3 (1968). 
4 See Temple v. Phelps, 193 Mass. 297, 304, 79 N.E. 482, 484 ( 1906). 
5 See Commonwealth v. Clark, 363 Mass. 467, 470-71, 295 N.E.2d 163, 166 
(1973); Commonwealth v. Gallo, 275 Mass. 320, 328-34, 175 N.E. 718, 722-24 
(1931). 
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it was unaware of any Massachusetts case law where the question of 
unavailability arose in the context of the exercise of an evidentiary 
privilege. 6 Hence, the question was a novel one to the Court. • 
The defendant in Di Pietro was convicted of unarmed robbery and 
of first degree murder. 7 At trial, the defendant had objected to the 
admission of a transcript of the testimony of the defendant's wife at 
the probable cause hearing. The defendant asserted that because his 
wife was present in the courtroom, the condition precedent for the 
admission of previous testimony, that the witness be unavailable, had 
not been satisfied. 8 
At the time of the probable cause hearing, the witness, Marianne 
Berlanger, had not yet married the defendant. However, four days 
before the trial, the defendant and Ms. Berlanger were married.D \Vhen 
she was called to testify at the trial Ms. Berlanger asserted her marital 
privilege as provided by General Laws chapter 233, section 20,10 and 
refused to testify against her husband.U The Commonwealth then 
offered in evidence the transcript of Ms. Berlanger's testimony at the 
district court probable cause hearing.12 Admitting that the evidence 
was hearsay, the Commonwealth argued that because the witness had 
become unavailable, the testimony was admissible as an exception to 
the hearsay rule.13 
Agreeing with the Commonwealth that the prior testimony was ad-
missible, the Supreme Judicial Court stressed that its concern would 
be "whether the testimony of the witness is sought and is available 
and not whether the witness' body is available." 14 The Court saw no 
reason to distinguish between the unavailability of expected testimony 
because of the death of a witness and the unavailability of testimony 
of a witness who is present but chooses to exercise a privilege not to 
testify.15 Quoting Commomcealth v. Gallo,1 6 the Court stated that the 
ground for the admission of previous testimony in such circumstances 
6 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1987, 367 N.E.2d at 819. 
7 Id. at 1971, 367 N.E.2d at 813. 
s Id. at 1972 n.1 & 1984, 367 N.E.2d at 813 n.1 & 818. 
u Id. at 1972-73, 367 N.E.2d at 813. 
10 G.L. c. 233, § 20 provides in relevant part: "Second, Except as otherwise 
proviued in section seven of chapter two hundred and seventy-three, neither husband 
nor wife shall be compelled to testify in the trial of an indictment, complaint or 
other criminal proceeding against the other. 
11 1977 ~lass. Adv. Sh. at 1977, 367 N.E.2d at 815. 
12 Id. at 1978, 367 N.E.2d at 815. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 1987, 367 N.E.2d at 819, quoting Mason v. United States, 408 F.2d 
903,906 (lOth Cir. 1969), cert. denied 400 U.S. 993 (1971). 
Ia 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1987-88, 367 N.E.2d at 819. 
lG 275 Mass. 320, 334, 175 N .E. 718, 724 ( 1931). 
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is that "necessity requires it to the end that justiclmay be done." 17 
The Court emphasized that in the instant case, the efense had cross-
examined Ms. Berlanger at the probable cause hea ing to the extent 
that it chose to do so,18 and that, therefore, the paramount condition 
for admissibility had been met.l9 
Having determined that Ms. Berlanger was an "utavailable witness" 
for purposes of the exception to the hearsay rule, th Court proceeded 
to answer a second challenge to the admissibility f Ms. Berlanger's 
previous testimony raised by the defendant. The defendant attacked 
the introduction of the transcribed testimony into evidence under the 
provisions of General Laws chapter 221, section 91B, which limits the 
transcripts that can be introduced as evidence to "offlcial" transcripts.20 
The transcript in the instant case was prepared *y a stenographer 
provided by the defendant at his own expense as was a permissible 
practice at the time under then section 91B. That statute did not allow 
transcripts prepared for defendants to be admitted las evidence under 
General Laws chapter 233, section 80.21 I 
The Court agreed that at the time of the defeddant's trial in the 
superior court in April of 1975, chapter 233, section 80, by its terms, 
applied only to "[t]ranscripts from stenographic notes duly taken under 
authority of law in the Supr.eme Judicial, Superior.and~Probate Courts." 22 
However, the Court proceeded to conclude that "t ere is no require-
ment of the law of this Commonwealth that the pr or testimony of a 
witness who since testifying, has become unavailable to testify at a 
later trial, may be proved only by means of an official transcript 
complying in every respect with the strictures of Gt. c. 233, § 80." 23 
In reaching this conclusion, the Di Pietro Court elied on its prior 
decision of Commonwealth v. Mustone, 24 wherein th Court had stated 
that it did not view chapter 221, section 91B, as making unofficial 
transcripts of district court proceedings "inadmissible if, under com-
mon law principles, they could be admitted apart om G.L. c. 233, 
17 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1988, 367 N.E.2d at 819. 
18 Id. at 1976, 367 N.E.2d at 815. 
19 Id. at 1987, 367 N.E.2d at 819. Whether meeting this condition entitles the 
Commonwealth to admission of the prior testimony is. not entr.ely free from doubt. 
See text at notes 36-44 infra discussing Barber v. Page, 390 .S. 719 ( 1968). 
20 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1998-99, 367 N.E.2d at 824. 
21 G.L. c. 233, § 80 and G.L. c. 233, § 91B were amen ed by Acts of 1975, 
c. 457, §§ 1 & 2 and would now allow introduction of the testimony via transcripts 
under the circumstances present in Di Pietro, where the stenographer was not ap-
pointed by the court but provided by the defendant. I 
22 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1998-99, 367 N.E.2d at 824. 
23 Id. at 2000, 367 N.E.2d at 824. 
24 353 Mass. 490, 233 N.E.2d 1 ( 1968). 
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§ 80, as an exception to the hearsay rule or otherwise." 25 Quoting 
further from Mustone, the Court stated: 'The stenographer and any 
other person may testify about what was said at the earlier hearing, 
if the trial judge determines that, through the witness, the former 
testimony can be substantially reproduced in all material particulars 
and that the witness is now unavailable." 26 
Having thus concluded that there was no error in admitting the 
previous testimony of Ms. Berlanger under the "unavailable witness" 
exception to the hearsay rule, the Court affirmed the conviction.27 
The reasoning of the Di Pietro Court in expanding the meaning of an 
unavailable witness to include witnesses who successfully assert testi-
monial privileges is sound. While the question had never been con-
fronted in Massachusetts, the Court's decision rested upon precedents 
developed in other jurisdictions. 28 It is only natural to construe the 
term "unavailable witness" to encompass all situations where the witness' 
testimony cannot be obtained in open court for whatever reason, so 
long as the witness is truly unavailable. While the Court did not decide 
the question, it would seem that the "unavailable witness" should also 
include a witness who will not speak, not out of entitlement to a 
privilege, but out of outright refusal to testify on the matter at issue. 
This situation, as well as the witness with poor memory, is covered 
by the Federal Rule of Evidence 804( a) definition of unavailability.29 
Since the Court was influenced by the physical presence of the witness 
in Di Pietro, it appears that the Court will in time expand its definition 
of unavailability to cover these situations. 
The DiPietro Court was also faced with a claim that the defendant's 
constitutional right of confrontation 30 had been violated by the intro-
25 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2000, 367 N.E.2d at 824-25 quoting Mustone, 353 
Mass. at 493 n.1, 233 N.E.2d at 4 n.l. 
26 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2000-01, 367 N.E.2d at 825 quoting Mustone, 353 
Mass. at 494, 233 N.E.2d at 4. 
27 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2005, 367 N.E.2d at 827. 
28 See id. at 1989-92, 367 N.E.2d at 820-21 for extensive citations to authorities. 
29 FED. R. Evm. 804 (a) provides in relevant part: 
(a) Definition of unavailability. "Unavailability as a witness" includes situa-
tions in which the declarant- . . . 
( 2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of his state-
ment despite an order of the court to do so; or 
( 3) testified to a lack of memory of the subject matter of his statement . . . . 
I d. 
30 See U.S. CaNST. amend. VI "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him. . . ."); MAss. 
CaNsT. pt. I, art. XII ( "[E]very subject shall have a right . . . to meet the 
witnesses against him face to face .... "). 
8





150 1978 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETI'S ¥-w §7.2 
I 
duction at his trial of previous testimony.31 The !court disagreed, 
stating that the point "has long since been foreclpsed against the 
defendant's contention by numerous decisions of thisl court and other 
courts." 32 The Court viewed the accused's confroptation rights as 
preserved whenever the accused has };lad an opport. unitf to cross-examine 
the unavailable witness in a prior proceeding,33 whi h Di Pietro did 
in fact do. 34 The Court did not see this rule affected b recent decisions 
of the United States Supreme Court, stating: i 
While it may appear that varying results have b~en reached in 
several of the more recent decisions of the United ~tates Supreme 
Court involving the admissibility of the prior testim. o y of a witness, 
the differences in results were due to differences in nderlying facts 
rather than to any change in the basic interpretat on of the con-
frontation clause. u 
The Court's dismissal of the importance of the Unit d States Supreme 
Court cases may have been a little too easy. While t e Supreme Court 
has not spoken conclusively on the issue, certain state ents from Barber 
v. Page 36 indicate that the Supreme Judicial Courts distinction "on 
the underlying facts" 37 might not be tenable. In arber, the Court 
overturned the petitioner's conviction on the grounds hat he had been 
denied his sixth and fourteenth amendment rights to confront the 
witnesses against him.38 At the time of the petitione 's trial, the State 
of Oklahoma had contended that the prosecution's star witness was 
unavailable because he was incarcerated in a federal rison in Texas.39 
Agreeing with this contention, the trial judge allo ed the witness' 
testimony at the probable cause hearing to be introd ced as evidence, 
over the defendant's objection.40 This testimony w s admitted even 
though the defendant's counsel had not cross-examin d the witness at 
the prior proceeding.41 ! 
31 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1978-79, 367 N.E.2d at 816. 
32 Id. at 1979, 367 N.E.2d at 816. 
33 Id. at 1979-82, 367 N.E.2d at 816-17 quoting Mattox v United States, 156 
U.S. 237, 241 ( 1895); Commonwealth v. Richards, 35 Mass. 18 Pick.) 434, 437 
(1837). 
34 See 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1976, 367 N.E.2d at 815. 
35 Id. at 1983-84, 367 N.E.2d at 818 citing California v. Qreen, 399 U.S. 149, 
165-68 ( 1970); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 ( 1968); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 
400, 402-08 ( 1965). 
36 390 u.s. 719 ( 1968). 
37 See 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1983-84, 367 N.E.2d at 818. 
38 390 U.S. at 720-21. 
39 Id. at 720. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 720, 722, 
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The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, stating that the witness 
was available and that, therefore, the petitioner must be given an 
opportunity to confront him at trial.42 Here, the "underlying facts" are 
different from Di Pietro. Most significant, however, is the Court's dicta 
that it would have reached the same result even if the defendant had 
cross-examined the witness at the probable cause hearing.43 In broad 
language the Court stated: 
The right to confrontation is basically a trial right. It concludes 
both the opportunity to cross-examine and the occasion for the jury 
to weigh the demeanor of the witness. A preliminary hearing is 
ordinarily a much less searching exploration into the merits of the 
case than a trial simply because its function is the more limited one 
of determining whether probable cause exists to hold the accused 
for trial. 44 
Thus, Barber v. Page appears to contain a caveat directed at the 
state courts that there are constitutional limitations beyond which the 
definition of an "unavailable witness" cannot be expanded. The point 
at which a state's interpretation of an "unavailable witness" runs afoul 
of the right of the accused to confront the witnesses against him remains 
unclear. Whether the definition of "unavailable witness" adopted by 
the Supreme Judicial Court in Di Pietro is constitutionally acceptable 
for criminal trials is yet to be determined. 
42 Id. at 724-25. 
43 ld. at 725. 
H Id. Prior to Barl1er, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld the 
admission at trial of testimony taken at probable cause hearings when the witness 
became unavailable. But the court questioned this practice noting that there is a 
great difference in the strategy and tactics used in the cross-examination of a 
witness during a trial and those used in a probable cause hearing. See Govern-
ment of the Virgin Islands v. Aquino, 378 F.2d 540, 549 (3d Cir. 1967). 
10
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